The Understanding of ‘Information’ and Information Science

Introduction

“Information is not just one thing. It means different things to those who expound its characteristics, properties, elements, techniques, functions, dimensions, and connections.” (Machlup and Mansfield, p. 4)

In everyday life, the word ‘information’ is closely associated with the concept of communication, more specifically with the aspect of communication of ideas, thoughts, and knowledge, bringing forth an understanding of information that it has properties to convey ideas, thoughts, concepts and knowledge. But, how exactly is information conveyed? If information is conveyable, is it the process that helps convey understanding between two human beings, or is information the knowledge conveyed between two cognitive entities? These questions bring forth different understanding of the word information, as Machlup and Mansfield (1983) have succinctly capture it in the above quote, suggesting that information is not a thing that is simple to describe and explain. It is a phenomenon with multifaceted understanding, perhaps requiring multitude of methodologies and means of investigation and research. Buckland (1991) identifies three principal uses of the word information: 1) information-as-process (the ability to inform), 2) information-as-knowledge (the knowledge imparted in the process of being informed), and 3) information-as-thing (p.3), concentrating on the various properties of information and its different manifestations and understandings.

As with any phenomenon that has been recognized as such, the information phenomenon is also being investigated and researched. Various disciplines have claimed information as their object of study. This is not surprising when one considers the multitude of understanding of this phenomenon. Information science, as a research and practical enterprise is at the forefront as the most pertinent discipline attempting to explicate the information phenomenon with its related properties, manifestations, behaviors, and processes. To this extend, Vakkari’s (1994) definition regarding information science’s purpose deserves attention: “The purpose to which information science is pledged is to facilitate access to desired information” (Vakkari, 1994, p. 47). The sense in which information is used in this definition is “information-as-thing … [which] is the only form of information with which information systems can deal directly” (Buckland, p.54). This sense appears to be the most pervasive use by researchers and practitioners in various fields and disciplines.

The existing literature dealing with information is very rich and enormous. For this research I have concentrated on the literature that covers both the understanding of the information phenomenon and discussions about its relation with the disciplines that take information as their object of study, more specifically with the information science discipline. Each of the discourses presented in the literature review recognize that there is something out there to be uniquely identified as information science and that the object of information science research and practice is not exclusively claimed by any other science or discipline. A general observation is that information science is science in making, not yet fully established as a ‘normal science’ in Kuhnian sense: “’normal science’ means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (Kuhn, 1970, p.108). Also, various information problems treated by information science lack a coherent paradigmatic understanding and definition of the information phenomenon: “in the absence of paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant” (Kuhn, p. 113). As such, the multitude of information problems are addressed by variety of methodologies, conceptually viewpoint, and some theories borrowed by information science practitioners from other social and natural sciences with which information science has interdisciplinary relations.

The main questions that arise from the literature review relate to the understanding of how the various understandings of the information phenomenon have effected the development and the trends of the information science discipline; has information science been lead by those understandings or has the definition of the science effected the conceptualization of some understandings; how inevitable is for information science to be linked to clear and specific understandings of the information phenomenon. As with many other sciences, the short question to be asked is: does the science arise from the problem / phenomenon or the problem / phenomenon from the science?

In the attempt to answer these and some other related questions, the rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, the information phenomenon is discussed by presenting various viewpoints. I have termed this section “phenomenon in need of science” to reflect a similarity in discourses treating the information phenomenon. Few different theoretical and practical explications are presented. Second, the information science discipline is discussed. “A science in need of its investigative object” seems to be an appropriate title for this section trying to capture the general observations among the discourses dealing with the nature and history of information science as discipline. Various viewpoints describing and defining information science and its integrative elements, as well as its relationship with other disciplines and areas of study are presented.

A phenomenon in need of science: ‘Information’ for information science and practice

Buckland’s three senses of information, 1) information-as-process (the ability to inform), 2) information-as-knowledge (the knowledge imparted in the process of being informed), and 3) information-as-thing (p.3), are the most pervasive understanding of information in use by various disciplines, with information-as-thing perhaps most evidently effecting the understanding of information science research and practices so far. Before we proceed with the discussion on the relation between understanding of the information phenomenon and information science, few discourses regarding the information phenomenon are presented.

Brookes’s (1980) 'fundamental equitation of information science' K[S]+ΔI=K[S+ΔS] (Brookes, p. 131) is a very profound expression of the human and natural way of thinking and suggests a basis for treating various aspect of information related phenomena. Having defined information as a "small bit of knowledge” (p. 131), and as “an entity which pervades all human activity” (p.126), Brookes further explains his view of “knowledge as a structure of concepts linked by their relationship and information as a small part of such structure” (p. 131). 'Objective knowledge' is the main concept around which Brookes' fundamental equitation operates, situated in Popper’s World 3: “He [Popper] recognizes a third world, that of objective knowledge which is the totality of all human thought embodied in human artifacts, as in documents of course, but also in music, the arts, the technologies. These artifacts enshrine what Popper declares to be his autonomous—or near autonomous—world of objective knowledge” (p. 127). The other two Popper worlds are the physical world (World 1) and “World 2, the world of subjective mental states, [which] is occupied by our thoughts and mental images…” (p. 129). Practically, “in order to objectivise our individual thoughts we have to express them and deposit the records in World 3 where they are accessible to, and can therefore be critically considered by others” (p. 130) we go from World 1 to World 3 via World 2. It is this consideration of objective knowledge as recorded in the various artifacts and operating in World 3 that Brookes deems as the problem treatable by information science.

Buckland’s (1991) elaboration starts similarly as Brookes’s in that he also attempts to explicate the vagueness surrounding information and its aboutness. Buckland also talks about Popper’s Worlds I, II, and III without explicit reference:

“… [Knowledge/information] … is intangible. One cannot touch it or measure it in any direct way (Buckland, Ch.1)

“Therefore, to communicate them [knowledge, beliefs, and opinions], they have to be expressed, described, or represented in some physical way, as mark, signal, text, or communication.” (Buckland, Ch1)

The analogy to the properties of Popper’s World, I, II and III is apparent. The first quote is related to Popper’s Word III the world of objective knowledge as separate from the physical, while the second quote refers to World I and III, with the process of expressing, describing, and representing referring to the movement from World I to III via World II. What I mean by this is that the signals we perceive physically via our senses are processed and interpreted in our World II, and often deposited in various representations in World III.

Buckland expands much further than Brookes in relation to the cognitive viewpoints of information and knowledge (at least conceptually), stating that “Information is an attribute of the receiver’s knowledge and interpretation of the signal, nor the sender’s, nor some omniscient observer’s nor of the signal itself” (Ch1). Apparent from this statement is that information is situational and contextual and that one cannot talk of information void of context: “Since information and information handling is pervasive in human activities, an exploration of information systems that did not include the social, economic, and political context and the broad social role of information would be seriously incomplete” (Buckland, Ch1).

Brookes’s and Buckland’s explications on the information phenomenon recognize that information can be understood and treated not necessarily always in connection to its understanding as thing. They both discuss in a very theoretical sense, thought they do not provide any theory of information, aside from the definitions that provide researchers with a framework for their activities.

Belkin (1978) on the other side does not even attempt to define information. Instead, he emphasizes that a suitable concept of information is needed for both practical and theoretical developments in information science (Belkin, p.82). Belkin (1982) defines the information concepts in these terms: information as a property of matter, information as event, semantic information, information and uncertainty, information and decision making, information as knowledge surrogate, information as structure (Belkin, 1982). It is evident that Belkin is interested not in definition of information, rather in presenting a framework in which the information related concepts are sufficiently understood for researchers and practitioners to proceed with the treatment of information related problems. Buckland’s three senses of information seem to be included within the above description of the information concept.

Saracevic (1999) also views information as “a basic phenomenon… However, the investigation of the basic phenomenon is proceeding … by investigating the manifestation, behavior, and effects of phenomena under question” (Saracevic, 1999, p. 1053). Information science is evolving not with the understanding of ‘information’ but with the understanding of the problem (Saracevic, 1991, p.11). Similarly to Belkin’s view of the information concept, Saracevic is not interested in the definition of information (besides stating that it is a basic phenomenon). Rather, Saracevic applies the understanding of information-as-thing, a problem oriented understanding of information, that can help with the problem of information explosion, i.e. the problem related to the vast amount of information objects (textual) available. Thus, information science needs to addresses the problem of “the massive task of making more accessible a bewildering store of knowledge” (Saracevic, 1999, p.14), referring to Bush’s (1945) elaboration on the amount of production of scientific information being produced every day.

Weaver (1949) also treats the information phenomenon, emphasizing it as a technical problem and justifiably warning that “information must not be confused with meaning” (Weaver, p.8). He is concerned with the technical level of information, mainly transmitting symbols through communication channels. Certainly, as we’ll see in the next section, this is not the sense of information used by information science research and practice.

As we have seen so far, the information phenomenon has been treated in practical and theoretical orientations. Buckland and Brookes have attempted to provide theoretical discussions about the interplay of information with knowledge, mental structures, and information objects, without providing any theory of information. Nevertheless, Brookes believes that the theoretical understanding of information should lead the evolution of information science, perhaps because other established sciences have had clear understanding of their object of study.

A science in need of its investigative object: Information science and practice and its object of study and pragmatic utility

Brookes (1980), noting that “theoretical information science hardly yes exists” (p. 125), defines “the task of information science … as the exploration of this world of objective knowledge which is an extension of, but is distinct from, the world of documentation and librarianship” (p. 125). Brookes identifies information science apart from other social sciences as the “most intimately concerned with the interaction between the mental and physical processes or between subjective and objective modes of thought” (p. 126). In attempt to identify what information science ought to do, Brookes recognizes that “documents and knowledge are not identical entities” (p. 127), and differentiates between practical and theoretical information science: “the practical work of library and information scientists can now be said to collect and organize for use the records of World 3. And the theoretical task is to study the interactions between Worlds 2 and 3, to describe them and explain them if they can and so to help in organizing knowledge rather than documents for more effective use” (p. 128-9). This distinction between practical and theoretical seems like a proper working distinction, even though it is not very clear about the scope. One can argue that in both definitions (practical and theoretical) one can have theoretical and practical research. Perhaps, a better distinction would have been to identify what sort of treatment of the different senses of information could be considered as theoretical and which as practical. Brookes is perhaps correct to suggest that “what information science needs at its roots, it seems to me, is objective rather than a subjective theory of knowledge” (Brooks, p. 127), thus the theory would operate in the realm of World 3, the world of objectivised knowledge (and information) and its interaction will World 2. Practically, this suggests a theoretical study of interactive processes and presentation of mental activities, as well as understanding the representation and its effect on mental activities and knowledge structures. Perhaps Brookes’s 'fundamental equitation of information science' is his attempt towards establishing the theoretical ground of information science. Nevertheless, the history has shown (so far) that it has not had that effect, besides for providing the conceptual framework for the cognitive viewpoint in information science.

That information science is evolving not with the understanding of ‘information’ but with the understanding of the problem is noted by Saracevic (1991) as well (p.11): “Information science, as a science and as a profession, is defined by the problem it has addressed and the methods it has used for their solution over time” (Saracevic, 1999, p.1051). The problems related to information explosion are contextual and social in nature “… produced by mid-century a scientific and technological revolution. A most visible of these revolutions as the phenomenon of ‘information explosion,” referring to the exponential and unabated growth of scientific and technical publications and information records of all kinds” (Saracevic, 1999, p.1052). Saracevic (1991) through the analysis of information science interdisciplinarity with librarianship, computer science, cognitive science, and communication, shows that information science is different in its methodology, problem treatment, research agendas, theoretical grounds, frameworks, etc.

Rayward (1996) provides a historical overview of information science, suggesting that information science as a distinct discipline emerged from part of library science and part of computer science (Rayward, p.8), concluding “that the history of information science is an historical interdiscipline and those interested in it need to draw on a range of related historical studies such as the history of science and technology, the history of printing and publishing, and the history of information institutions such as libraries, archives and museums” (Rayward, p.3). If information science as a field indeed was shaped by things from library and computer science, it is only reasonable to suggest that the problems of treatment by information science have come from there, suggesting that even the understanding of what information is must have been influenced by them.

Machlup and Mansfield (1983), aiming to “to analyze the logical (or methodological) and pragmatic relations among the disciplines and subject areas that are centered on information” (p. 3), look at the various sciences, disciplines, and fields of studies who directly or indirectly take information to be their subject of study. They present a well rounded argument and historical overview of the same. The aim is to explicate if possible the intersection (its nature and properties) of all those activities that deal with information directly or indirectly, given that “Information is not just one thing. It means different things to those who expound its characteristics, properties, elements, techniques, functions, dimensions, and connections” (Machlup et al., 4). The preceding quote also suggests that the different meanings of information have paved the way for the emergence and divergence of many different sciences, disciplines and fields of study related to information. To remedy this diffusion Machlup et al. suggest: “that most of the confusion caused by the use of the term information science in its broadest sense could be avoided by the addition of the plural s. The information sciences could then take place alongside the natural sciences, the social sciences, and other umbrella terms that indicate a grouping of disciplines and fields of study that share a common characteristics” (p19). This suggestion is novel one, perhaps one day we will be talking of the ‘school of information sciences’. However, to come to this point, first, there must be some common understanding shared among the more than forty or fifty disciplines Machlup et al. have identified. Perhaps this is the intersection that does not fit well in any other field which could be rightfully called information science (in singular): “We shall now ask ourselves whether there can be an independent information science with a narrower focus–the problem of information linked neither to computer science nor to library science and also avoiding the vagueness associated with information science in its broadest sense” (p.22). In an attempt to understand and identify such intersection Machlup et al. elaborate in detail the interplay between the scholarly and practical treatment of information related problems and phenomena and the various interdisciplinary fields that have claimed the problems to belong to their particular field. When defining the narrow sense of information science they state that “information science is used as the name for a new area of study that is evolving from the intersection of the other three mentioned [i.e. broader sense, as related to computer science, and as related to library science] areas, with perhaps a special interest in improved communication of scientific and technological information and in the application of well-tested research methods to the study of information systems and services” (Machlup and Mansfield, p. 18). I do not necessarily agree with this. This assessment / conclusion seems to be a bit skewed and not representative of the activities of information science. There is more to information science than scientific and technological information. The definition of the broader sense which “which stands for the systematic study of information and may include all or any of combination of the academic disciplines” (Machlup and Mansfield, p. 18) is perhaps more representative description.

How can one tell apart one science from another? Does it need clear definition of the object of study or it is enough to claim ground to problems not holistically claimed by other sciences and disciplines?

Vakkari (1994), in the elaboration of the relation between information science and other sciences and information related disciplines, recognizes that “in theoretical discussions, however, it has seldom been shown explicitly what theories, concepts, or methods from other disciplines could be used in the problems of information science” (p.48). Again, as it has been shown by other authors, there is a lack of theoretical background for the treatment of various information problems as well as the information phenomenon itself. In conclusion, Vakkari (relaying on Belkin) also states that the problem oriented understanding of the information phenomenon is the basis for information science: “His [Belkin’s] formulation about the fundamental problem of information science to facilitate the effective communication of desired information between human generator and user, forms the legitimation and also the foundation for information science. It defines the scope of the field. It functions as the context for defining the basic concepts of information science” (Vakkari, p.49). Thus the “discussion about the nature, scope, and common central concepts of the field of research in question is not seen as relevant to those problems” (Vakkari, 1994, p.1).

From the above summaries it is evident that there has been an attempt by practitioners and researchers of the information phenomenon to establish a very fundamental and firm theoretical ground. Instead, the practical problem oriented understanding of information seems to have taken a hold, perhaps pushing information science into answering and treating the most relevant problems the society faced with the information explosion. A successful treatment of the problems related to the information explosion seems not to have needed a more theoretical understanding of the information phenomenon. But, how do we know that a grounded theory of the information phenomenon would not have established a more effective and unified framework for dealing with information related phenomena?

Discussion points

The literature review makes it clear that the many disciplines that take information (in whatever sense) to be their object of investigation, whether for research or practice, all have their distinct approaches and methodologies, mostly based on the problem they are trying to resolve: “Information science, as a science and as a profession, is defined by the problem it has addressed and the methods it has used for their solution over time” (Saracevic, 1999, p.1051). The closer two disciplines are, their approaches and methodologies are closer to each other. Nevertheless, all these disciplines and areas of study have something in common, information, independently of the sense being used. The fact that there is no clear fundamental explication of the information phenomenon and that what we term today as information science has managed to operate without one is not a justification that theoretical and unified understanding of the information phenomenon would not be beneficial to information science. The pervasiveness of information in communication processes also suggest a possibility that a basic and fundamental theoretical understanding of information with its proper theories of information and theoretical framework may provide means for studying various information related problem in a unified and systematic way. To this extend Machlup and Mansfield propose a novel suggestions: “that most of the confusion caused by the use of the term information science in its broadest sense could be avoided by the addition of the plural s. The information sciences could then take place alongside the natural sciences, the social sciences, and other umbrella terms that indicate a grouping of disciplines and fields of study that share a common characteristics” (p19). This suggestion is novel one, perhaps one day we will be talking of the ‘school of information sciences’. However, to come to this point, first, there must be some common understanding regarding the basic phenomenon shared among the more than forty or fifty information related disciplines Machlup and Mansfield have identified.

The possibility of such shared and unified understanding is also suggested by the fact that “relations among different disciplines [that treat information] are therefore relations among the expressed thoughts of selected scholars (scientists)” (Machlup and Mansfield, p. 3), where “in its broader sense, it [information science] stands for the systematic study of information and may include all or any of combination of the academic disciplines” (p. 18). Macklup and Mansfield seem to be ahead of their time as so far it is hard to argue that information science stands for the systematic study of information. At best, the consistency is that information science seems to addresses information related problems.

Apparent from all the readings is that information science as a discipline and a field of study is fairly new, in its defining stage, successfully identifying the problems it can investigate and treat, unfortunately without any common theoretical ground. In this sense one can argue that information science has not yet reached the stage of ‘normal science’ in Kuhnian sense. However, the apparent path information science has followed so far is within the scope of the development towards a ‘normal science’: “No wonder, then, that in the early stages of development of any science different men confronting the same range of phenomena describe and interpret them in different ways” (Kuhn, p.115).

Does the science arise from the phenomenon / problem or the problem / phenomenon from the science? How inevitable is that the information phenomenon give rise to information science? In terms of Kuhn’s development towards a normal science, it is expected that the process is mutually informative where the problem (whether theoretical or practical) arises in need to a discipline to investigate it. The development and proper identification of the problem / phenomenon with its basic understandings is evolutionary process dynamically being recast and redefined together with the evolutionary trends shaping the discipline in questions. Information science appears to be following the same track with the information related problems acting as catalysts for the creation of various frameworks within which specific information problems can be resolved. At the same time, once a framework is successful in resolving a given information problem, similar problems are attempted within its scope. If Kuhn gets his way with information science, sooner or later we’ll see information science in the family of established normal sciences. However, for this to happen, among other things, unified theory of information, or perhaps a family of theories of information need to emerge: “It seems that the cognitive view has taken the role of the leading orientation strategy in our [i.e. information science] field of research. Its most challenging task is to try to overcome its methodological individualism by enriching its theorization with concepts of social structure” (Vakkari, p.51).

Why does it matter which way we understand information? Considering the strong need to deal with information need problems and information seeking (due to information pervasiveness in our society), it is a bit surprising that there have not been strong attempts to decompose the concept of ‘information’ into its more elementary entities/units? Obviously, my assumption is that the ‘information’ concept as the main ingredient of information science research ought to be further decomposable into more elementary entities.

The following quote by Brookes presents a great challenge: “In other words, once human knowledge has been recorded [in World III], it attains a degree of permanence, an objectivity, an accessibility which is denied to the subjective knowledge of individual humans” (Brookes, p. 128). Most intriguing is about this statement is that knowledge, once recorder, attains a degree of permanence, objectiveness, and accessibility. Not quite sure if Brookes meant to say relative permanence, objectivity and accessibility bound by time and space. Otherwise, it would suggest that the recorded knowledge and information have an intrinsic property or characteristics or structures which can be detached and maintained in truly objective manner outside of the situation and the context it was created. If so, understanding these characteristic, structures, properties and manifestation could be the first steps towards the theory of information.

If information science is distinct such that it cannot be classified as natural science or a social science, then maybe it is not even appropriate to analyze its development in term of Kuhn’s ‘normal science’. The uniqueness of the information phenomenon perhaps suggests that information science act as the unifying concept (Vakkari, p.8) across various sciences. The potential as unifying concept is also evident from the fact that it is “most intimately concerned with the interaction between the mental and physical processes or between subjective and objective modes of thought” (Brookes, p.126). Brookes, like others, first claims that information science is different, and then suggest that quantitative and qualitative methods be adapted for the study of information and knowledge. In this case, it would also mean that the methodological tools of information science should be unique and not necessarily those of the other ‘normal sciences’.

In the various discourses presented in the literature review, a very suggestive and potential understanding of the information phenomenon was surprisingly missing. The following quote by Brookes: “The artifacts which record human knowledge exosomatically become independent of the knowing subjects who created them. These artefacts are no longer subjective and inaccessible but objective and accessible to all who care to study them….” (p. 128) suggests that the various information and knowledge artifactcs contain within objective information and knowledge. If these physical objects carry and transmit the symbols, isn’t it feasible then to think of ‘information’, somehow embedded with the symbols, as the conceptual channel for transmitting ideas, thought, concepts, knowledge? The suggestion of this thought or conceptualization of information would not have been justified if knowledge deposited in knowledge artifacts could not be considered “independent of the knowing subjects who created them”.

Conclusion

Whether information science will follow the footsteps of a ‘normal science’ only history will reveal. If the term science in ‘information science’ is an appropriately attached term, it suggests that information science is on its way to become a ‘normal science’. However, for it to be considered as such, a unifying theoretical framework in support of (or as the basis of) various individualized approaches and frameworks treating the multitude of information problems and issues ought to emerge. From Buckland’s elaboration it appears as if it is more likely that the term ‘information science’ will evolve into the term ‘information sciences’ over time, for which it is not necessary to have a unified theory of information. Instead, multiple theoretical frameworks of information might emerge similar to the already well established research framework of information retrieval (IR).

In any case, the literature review does suggest properties and attributes of the information phenomenon exhibiting themselves, albeit not always most obviously, across the different information problems and the frameworks within which they are treated. One such sense, “information-as-thing … [as] the only form of information with which information systems can deal directly” (Buckland, p.54) has been at the forefront of information problem such as information access, information behavior, and IR within their appropriate context, all due to the challenges emerging from the bewildering amount of information production.

As in any other research and practical enterprise, various pertinent elements constantly inform each other. For information science, so far, the practical, problem oriented understanding of the information phenomenon has been the driving force, with information science research proposing methodologies and resolutions. At the same time information science practitioners are facing theoretical issues in their quest to resolve various information problems. A unified, grounded theory of information might be the answer to closing the gap. [194:610]

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